Paul T. Moore  v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Company, A Corporation : Brief of Respondent by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1981
Paul T. Moore v. Burton Lumber & Hardware
Company, A Corporation : Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.RAYMOND M. BERRY, BRUCE H. JENSEN; Attorneys for
Defendant-AppellantW. EUGENE HANSEN; Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Moore v. Burton Lumber, No. 16672 (Utah Supreme Court, 1981).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1970
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
--------------------------------------------------
PAUL T. MOORE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 16672 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Appeal from the Judgment of the Third 
District Court, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David K. Winder, Judge 
RAYMOND M. BERRY 
BRUCE H. JENSEN 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appel lant 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
W. EUGENE HANSEN 
RALPH L. DEWSNUP 
HANSEN & THOMPSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-
Respondent 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 533-0400 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CASES CITED 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
STATUTES CITED 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
STA~EMENT OF FACTS 
ARGUMENT . 
POINT I. THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY ON DEFENDANT'S DUTY TO ITS BUSINESS 
INVITEES WERE NOT ERRONEOUS, NOR WERE THEY 
PREJUDICIAL IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE· • . . . 
A. The Court did not err in refusing to 
instruct the jury on defendant's 
responsibility to a business invitee 
concerning an obvious danger because 
there was no evidence that the dangerous 
condition of the saw in question was 
PAGE 
iii 
iv 
v 
1 
1 
2 
2 
9 
9 
obvious. . . . . . . . • . . . 10 
B. When the jury instructions are read 
as a whole, they show that defendant's 
duty to a business invitee was 
properly explained and no error was 
committed. . . • • 14 
C. Comparison of the Court's instructions 
concerning defendant's duties to 
licensees as opposed to business 
invitees does not demonstrate error 
with respect to the latter. 
D. Even if the court's instructions con-
cerning defendant's duty toward an 
invitee had been erroneous, defendant 
has failed to show that they were 
prejudicial. · • • · · · · • · 
-i-
18 
19 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
PAGE 
POINT II. THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS ON 
ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK WAS NOT ERROUEOUS 
NOR WAS IT PREJUDICIAL, Ii'.1 LIGHT OF THE 
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 
• • • • 21 
A. The court did not err in refusing 
to instruct the jury on the doctrine 
of assumption of risk, due to the fact 
that there was insufficient evidence 
presented to have sustained such a 
defense theory. . • . . . . . 22 
B. The Utah Comparative Negligence 
Statute authorizes the court's refusal 
to specially instruct on the doctrine 
of assumption of risk under the 
circumstances of this case. . . 25 
C. The evidence in this case does not 
support the application of primary 
assumption of risk principles even if 
the primary/secondary assumption of 
risk approach were to be adopted as 
the law in Utah. • • . . . . . . . 31 
D. Even if the Court's refusal to separately 
instruct the jury on the assumption 
of risk doctrine had been erroneous, 
defendant has failed to show that said 
refusal was prejudicial. . 35 
POINT III. THERE IS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO 
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONTENTIONS THAT PLAINTIFF'S 
CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OR EVEN 
A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF HIS INJURIES AS A HATTER 
OF LAW 
CONCLUSION • 
-ii-
36 
39 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED 
Becker v. Beaverton School District No. 48, 
551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976) ... 
Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 621 (Utah 1977) 
Bruner v. McCarthy, 105 Utah 399, 142 P.2d 
649 (1943) ..... . 
Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d 8, 465 P.2d 169 
(1970) .... 
Cox v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 
(1953) ..... 
Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 
PAGE 
29, 30 ,33 
15 
• . . . • 11 
. . . . . 28 
. • . . • 37 
601 P. 2d 152 (Utah 1979) .••. . • . . • . 23 
Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Cor-
poration, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283 
(1972) •.•.•..... 10,15, 20 ,40 
Ferguson v. Jongsma, 
P. 2d 404 (1960) 
10 Utah 2d 179, 350 
Foster v. Steed, 23 Utah 2d 148, 459 P.2d 
1021 (1969) • • . • • ••. 
Gilhespie v. DeJong, 520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974) 
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 
664 (1966) . • •..• 
Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 143, 239 P.2d 
215 (1951) . . . . . . . . . . . 
Hindmarsh v. o. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 Utah 
2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968) . . . . 
Johnson v. Maynard, 9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 
884 (1959) . . . . . •..• 
23 I 24 
23 
10 I 15 
• 20 t 31 
. . . . 15 
. . . . 23 
23 I 24 
Joseph v. w. H. Groves Latter-day Saints 
Hospital, 10 Utah 2d 94, 348 P.2d 935 
(1960) . . . . • . . . . • . . • . • . . 10 
-iii-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CASES CITED - cont'd. 
PAGE 
Kuchenmeister v. Los Angeles and S. L. R. 
Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725 (1918) ..... 23, 24 
McGrath v. Wallace Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 
299 (10th Cir.1974) 
Powers v. G~ne's Building Materials, Inc., 
P.2d 17-:i,, (Utah 1977) · . 
Renner v. Kinney, 231 Or. 552, 373 P.2d 668 
• • • • 25 
567 
• • • • 11 
(1962) . . • . • • . . . •... 30, 33 
In Re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 
P.2d 542 (1956) • · • • • • . . . . 15 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 
563 p. 2d 124 7 (titah 1977) • • • • • . 31, 34 
26 Utah 2d Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 
448 I 491 P. 2d 1209 (1971) . • • • • • 17 I 18 I 19, 
20 t 35 
Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 
Utah 2d 301, 470 P.2d 399 (1970) 
Smith v. Clayton & Lambert Manufacturing Co., 
• 10 
438 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1973) 23 
Velasquezv. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 12 Utah 2d 379, 
366 p. 2d 989 (1961) • • • • . • • • . . 39 
AUTHORITIES CITED 
57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence §279 (1971) 
2 Harper, F. and F. James, The Law of Torts 
§21.8, (1956) ••.• 
5 3 Or. L. Rev. , 7 9, 81 ( 19 5 3) . 
31, 32 
28 I 311 321 
33 
• • 32 
Prosser, w. The Handbook of the Law of 
Torts (3d ed. 1964) • • • . . • • ••. 24, 29 
Restatement (Second) of Torts 
496G (1965) • . 
-iv-
§§496D, 23 
.... 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
AUTHORITIES CITED - cont'd 
PAGE 
6 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 244, 249-50 (1977) 32 
STATUTES CITED 
1975 Or. Laws, Ch. 599 §4 30 
Or.Rev.Stat., §18.470 (1973). 29, 30, 31 
Utah Code Ann. 1953, as amended 
§78-27-37 ..•.•. 26, 27, 29, 30 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 61 19 
-v-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
PAUL T. MOORE, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
vs. 
Civil No. 16672 
BURTON LUMBER & HARDWARE 
COMPANY, a Corporation, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a negligence action by a business invitee for 
damages sustained as a result of injuries suffered while 
using an unreasonably dangerous radial arm saw upon 
defendant's business premises. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This case was tried to a jury before the Honorable 
David K. Winder, District Judge of the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, in 
July of 1978. The jury returned a verdict finding that 
both plaintiff and defendant were negligent but further 
finding that only defendant's negligence was a proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. The jury awarded plaintiff 
$34,892.00 in special damages and $110,000.00 in general 
damages. Thereafter, on July 28, 1978, the court entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiff and against the defendant 
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Burton Lumber & Hardware Co. in accordance with the jury 
verdict. Defendant's motion for new trial was denied 
by the court on August 21, 1979. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent Paul T. Moore seeks affirmance of the 
lower court judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This appeal is primarily concerned with whether or 
not the court erred in refusing to give a portion of 
defendant's proffered instruction:; relating to (1) defen-
dant' s duty to warn a business invitee of obvious dangers 
associated with use of its radial arm saw, (2) plaintiff's 
alleged assumption of risks connected with use of the said 
radial arm saw, and (3) the proximate cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. Appellant's statement of facts omits much 
information of significance to this appeal and further 
contains certain errors which could prejudicially affect 
its outcome. Plaintiff therefore deems it necessary 
and appropriate to supplement and clarify said statement of 
facts as follows: 
During approximately a two-year period from June 1973 
to May 1975, plaintiff Paul T. Moore supervised a large 
building project for Deal Development Company at Salt Lake 
City, Utah. (R t 669 ) In Connec tion with said building • a • 
project, the Deal Development Company had an open account 
-2-
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with the defendant Burton Lumber Company which was used in 
charging hardware items and odds and ends purchased for the 
job. (R. at 645.) It was estimated by Buddy Prince, one 
of the employees of Deal, that prior to May 1, 1975, he 
had patronized the defendant Lumber Company about three 
times per week, spending an average of $25.00 to $50.00 
per visit on needed i terns. (R. at 645.) 
By May 1, 1975, the major carpentry work at the 
construction site had been completed and most subcontract-
ors had left. (R. at 670.) However, some "pickup work" 
remained to be done, including enclosing some air condi-
tioning ducts with wood blocks. ( R. at 6 4 4 , 6 7 0 • ) In 
order to complete this remaining work, Mr. Moore and Mr. 
Prince decided to ask Burton Lumber Company whether they 
could use the company radial arm saw to cut some two-by-
fours into the size blocks they needed. (R. at 644, 671-
672.) The two-by-fours were being stored at Intermountain 
Lumber Company near the railroad tracks where they had 
been off-loaded. (R. at 671.) 
On May 1, 1975, shortly before noon, the two men 
drove in a pickup truck to Burton Lumber Company. While 
Mr. Prince picked up needed hardware items for the job, 
Mr. Moore inquired at the desk about the saw. (R. at 644, 
673, 831, 838.) According to Mr. Moore, he was told by 
the employees at the desk, that if the yard man was not 
using the saw, it was all right for him to use it. (R. at 
-3-
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67 4.) The charge for cutting was left open and was 
to be 
added to the Deal Development Company account. (R. at 
67 4.) 
Appellant Burton Lumber claims that only employees 
were allowed to use its radial saw. (Brief of Appellant 
at 4.) Omitted is the fact that rebuttal witness Stanley 
Smith,who was not employed by defendant, testified to 
having used the radial arm saw in question six or seven 
times and to having done so with permission. (R. at 960-
961.) 
According to Mr. Moore, he went into the yard where 
he spoke with a :yardman named Jessie, and explained that 
he had been given permission to use the saw if it was not 
being used. {R. at 675.) Since Mr. Moore did not know 
where the saw was, Jessie took him to the saw shed and 
showed it to him. {R. at 675.) At that time, the saw 
was in a ripping position, whereas Mr. Moore needed it set 
for crosscutting. He, therefore, arranged with Jessie to 
have the saw rotated while he and Buddy Prince went to get 
their two-by-fours. (R. at 676.) He agreed to give Jessie 
a six-pack of beer if the saw could be rotated while they 
were gone. {R. at 647, 676.) Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince 
then left the yard to get their lumber, promising to 
return in five or ten minutes. (R. at 676.) 
Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince went immediately to Inter-
mountain Lumber Company where they got the two-by-fours 
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that they needed. (R. at 647, 677.) On their way back 
to Burton Lumber, they stopped at a small store where they 
bought the six-pack of beer which Mr. Moore had promised 
to the yard man, Jessie. ( R • at 6 4 7 - 6 4 8 , 6 77 - 6 7 8 • ) The 
beer was placed in a bag in the back of the pickup truck. 
(R. at 677.) Mrs. Moore noticed that it was still there a 
week after the accident which is the subject of this 
law suit had occurred. (R. at 973.) 
Mr. Moore and Mr. Prince returned to Burton Lumber 
Company and reentered the lumber yard the way they had 
left, whereupon they park.ed their pickup truck near the 
door to the shed where the radial arm saw was located. 
(R. at 648-649, 678-679.) (Attempts by appellant to infer 
a surreptious motive in parking the truck so as to hide 
it [See Brief of Appellant at 6], are unsupported by the 
evidence.) Mr. Moore noticed that the saw had been turned 
from the ripping position to the crosscutting position. 
(R. at 679.) Therefore, while Buddy Prince brought lumber 
in, Mr. Moore measured the length he wanted to cut the 
boards and drove a nail into the table for use as a fixed 
gauge so that he would not have to measure each cut 
separately. (R. at 650, 651, 679-680.) 
Mr. Moore started the saw and cut the first two-by-
four by placing the end of the board against the nail 
gauge, pulling the saw toward him and returning it, then 
knocking the cut block out of the way, and moving his two-
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by-four up to the nail gauge to repeat the process. (R. at 
757-758.) This procedure was duplicated approximately 
seven to nine times without Mr. Moore letting go of the 
saw. (R. at 758.) 
When he finished cutting the first two-by-four as 
described above, Mr. Moore pushed the saw all the way back 
to its return position, released it, and went to the end 
of the table to get the second two-by-four. (R. at 757, 
760.) He took hold of the second two-by-four with both 
hands and moved it along the table in front of a one-by-
four which served as a guide, toward the nail gauge which 
he had earlier placed in the table. (R. at 760-762.) He 
testified that while he was moving the board past the blade,. 
[the board] remained in front of the one-by-four guide at all 
times. (R. at 760.) His hands never slipped nor moved 
from the one-by-four, and his thumb did not raise off 
the board at any time. (R. at 761.) While thus working, 
Mr. Moore momentarily directed his attention to the nail 
gauge on the table to make sure his board abutted it, when 
suddenly he felt the saw grab his thumb and yank it into the 
blade. (R. at 762.) Before he could pull his hand away 
from the saw, the thumb, index and middle fingers of his 
right hand had been completely amputated, and his right 
and little fingers had been severely cut, though not 
completely separated from his body. (R. at 733.) 
Plaintiff called as his expert witness, Mr. Louis 
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c. Barbe, a safety engineer and certified safety professional 
whose credentials were presented to the court. (R. at 599-
601; 609.) Contrary to the statement in appellant's 
brief that Mr. Barbe had no experience in operating 
similar radial arm saws, (Brief of Appellant at 7), Mr. 
Barbe testified that he had operated and tested such 
equipment all his life. (R. at 609.) 
Mr. Barbe testified that he examined and observed 
the saw in question subsequent to the injury to Mr. 
Moore. (R. at 602.) It was established through his 
testimony, and through the testimony of Mr. Robert Burton, Vice 
President of Burton Lumber, that the radial arm saw in 
question had not been tilted or equipped to prevent the 
cutting head from moving out on the arm away from the 
column as a result of gravity or vibration. (R. at 604-
606; 618-619; 814.) It was also clearly established that 
the saw blade had not been equipped with proper safety 
guards. (R. at 604; 607-610; 616-618; 814-815.) Expert 
witnesses for both plaintiff and defendant agreed that 
these conditions violated minimum safety standards and 
made the saw defective and unreasonably dangerous. 
611-622, 956-958.) 
(R. at 
Appellant suggests in its brief that Mr. Barbe thought 
the saw was dangerous for lack of guards alone. (See Brief 
of Appellant at 6.) Such was not the testimony. Mr. 
Barbe testified that the danger was a result of the absence 
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of guards and the violation of minimum safety standards 
I 
including those designed to prevent spontaneous movement 
of the cutting head. (R. at 604-606; 618-620; 621-622.) 
The latter condition resulted in the saw having a tendency 
to spontaneously creep or drift out from its return 
position. Mr. Barbe testified that this was so. (R. at 
604-606.) Vernon Campos, employee of Burton Lumber, 
corroborated the fact that the saw had a tendency to creep 
when running. (R. at 931-933.) 
Paul Moore testified that he was not aware of this 
tendency. {R. at 762,792.) No one testified that the 
creeping tendency of the saw was open, obvious, plain-
to-be-seen, or in any way apparent to a first time user. 
In fact, the majority of defendant's employees testified 
that they did not know the saw crept. (R. at 823, 824, 826; 
854, 856; 871.) 
After several days of testimony, the matter was 
submitted to the jury on special interrogatories. The jury 
found that both parties were negligent but that plaintiff's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of his injuries. (R. 
at 1024.) Defendant's negligence was found to be the 
proximate cause of the injuries and damages were assess~ 
accordingly. (R. at 1024-1025.) 
Judgment was entered for plaintiff as aforesaid 
in accordance with the jury verdict. (R. at 428-429.) 
11 · f 1 posttri' al moti' ons, defendant Burton Fo owing unsuccess u 
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Lumber brought this appeal alleging error in the Court's 
instructions and error by the Court for failing to direct 
a verdict against plaintiff on the proximate cause question. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY ON DEFENDANT'S 
DUTY TO ITS BUSINESS INVITEES WERE NOT ERRONEOUS, 
NOR WERE THEY PREJUDICIAL IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND 
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE. 
Burton Lumber Company first argues for a reversal of 
the trial court's judgment in this case based on alleged 
errors by the Court in instructing the jury as to the 
duty of the lumber company toward a business invitee. 
Burton claims that the jury should have been told there 
was no duty to warn of an obvious danger. 
In deciding an appeal based on such a claim, three 
factors must be taken into consideration: (1) It must 
be established that the court's instruction was in fact 
erroneous; (2) Once established as erroneous, the 
instruction must be shown to have been prejudicial to 
the outcome of the case and to the rights of the appealing 
party; and (3) The party claiming error and prejudice must 
meet the burden of proof as to both aspects of such a 
claim. The Utah Supreme Court has stated this general 
proposition of law as follows: 
What the parties are entitled to and the 
law seeks to afford is an opportunity for one 
claiming a grievance which would justify legal 
-9-
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redress to present it to a court or jury and t h 
f · t · l h · · 0 ave a air ria . W en this is done and the verd' 
· ' ict ana Judgment are entered, all presumptions are in f 
f th · l · d · avor o eir va i ity. The burden is upon the 
appellant not only to show that there was error 
J;iut that it was_pre~udical to ~he.extent that there 
is reasonable likelihood that in its absence the 
would have been a different result. re 
Joseph v. W. H. Groves Latter-day Saints Hospital, 10 Utah 
2d 94, 348 P.2d 935, 938 (1960); Cf. Gilhespie v. DeJong, 
520 P.2d 878, 880 (Utah 1974); Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 
(1972); Simpson v. General Motors Corporation, 24 Utah 2d 
301, 470 P.2d 399, 402 (1970). 
In the present case, defendant/appellant, Burton Lumber 
Co. has not met its burden of proof of showing error in the 
instructions, nor of showing prejudice to its rights or 
to the outcome of the case. These points are more fully 
discussed hereinafter. 
A. The Court did not err in refusing to instruct the 
jury on defendant's responsibility to a business invitee 
concerning an obvious danger because there was no evidence 
that the dangerous condition of the saw in question was 
obvious. 
Respondent Paul Moore does not deny that, as a general 
proposition of law, an owner or occupier of land does not 
have a duty to warn his business invitees of dangers which ' 
are open or obvious. However, in order for a defendant to 
h d t · a defense to an action against rely on sue a oc rine as 
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him, and be entitled to a jury instruction thereon, that 
defendant must present evidence to justify application 
of the theory. The Utah Supreme Court has said: 
It is well recognized that the parties are 
entitled to have their theories of the case presented 
to the jury in the form of instructions, but only 
if they are supported by the evidence. 
Powers v. Gene's Building Materials, Inc. 567 P.2d 174, 176 
(Utah 1977). 
The above principle was applied in Bruner v. McCarthy, 
105 Utah 399, 142 P.2d 649 (1943). There, a railroad 
worker's leg was amputated when he fell from a train which 
his fellow worker had moved suddenly and unexpectedly. The 
defendant trustees of the railroad appealed the injured 
worker's successful action against them,claiming that the 
trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on the defense 
theory of contributory negligence was reversible error. 
Defendants postulated that they should have been entitled 
to such an instruction because plaintiff picked the most 
dangerous way he could have to do his task. The Supreme 
Court noted that "one difficulty with this position is that 
the record does not support it." Id. , 142 P.2d at 651. 
Judgment for plaintiff was affirmed. 
The present case is analogous to Bruner. Here, 
Burton Lumber postulates that the radial arm saw in question 
was dangerous for lack of safety guards and safety guards 
alone. It reasons that since the absence of such guards 
-11-
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was open and obvious to a user of the saw, · 
an instruction 
relating to its lack of duty was in order. A · sin~, 
however, the record does not support Burton's position. 
The record clearly shows that the real danger of 
the saw to Mr. Moore was the fact that its cutting head 
had a tendency to drift spontaneously out from the return 
position while the saw was running. (R. at 604-606; 
931-933.) The absence of proper safety guards only 
compounded the danger that such a condition posed to an 
unsuspecting user of the saw, since there was nothing to 
keep vulnerable hands and fingers from being caught and 
cut by the drifting blade. (R. at 610.) Why Burton 
Lumber has so carefully omitted all reference to this 
danger from its brief is not known. Nonetheless, such 
an omission deprives its arguments of whatever validity and 
legitimacy they might otherwise have claimed. 
Evidence showing the true nature of the danger posed 
by the saw was not sparse. Expert witness Louis Barbe 
testified that (1) the saw lacked appropriate guards 
and (2) was not mounted or equipped to control movement 
of the cutting head along the arm therefore resulting 
in a tendency for it to move spontaneously toward an 
operator while it was running. (R. at 604, 606, 618-619.) 
Defense witness Vern Campos agreed that the saw had a 
tendency to creep. (R. at 933.) Mr. Campos also indicated 
that such movement was rather erratic and inconsistent. (R' 
931-935.) Photographer Scott Heslop also testified that 
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even when not running, the saw drifted out from its return 
position. (R. at 965.) 
Mr. Barbe testified that minimum safety standards in 
1975 (including those promulgated by the American National 
standards Institute) required, as a minimum, that radial 
saws be equipped with certain types of safety guards 
which defendant's saw did not have, (R. at 615-618), and 
that the saw be positioned or equipped so that the cutting 
head would not roll or move out on the arm away from the 
column as a result of gravity or vibration. (R. at 618-
619.) It was clear from testimony of Robert Burton, 
Vice President of Burton Lumber, that no effort had been 
made to comply with either of these minimum safety 
requirements. (R. at 825-826.) 
Mr. Barbe, as well as the expert testifying for the 
defense both stated that the condition of the saw in reference 
to the above safety requirements made it defective and 
dangerous. (R. at 620; 956-958.) Mr. Barbe added that 
in his opinion Mr. Moore's injuries were caused by the 
said defective condition of the saw. (R. at 621-622.) It 
is clear from the full text of Mr. Barbe's testimony that 
he was not isolating the absence of guards as being the 
sole factor causing injury to Mr. Moore, but, rather, was 
blaming the injuries on the lack of guards together with 
the fact that the saw had a tendency to creep. 
Though there was ample evidence to show the creeping 
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tendency of the saw, there was no evidence introduced 
at any time to support an allegation that the danger 
therefrom to Mr. Moore was open or obvious. In fact, 
all evidence tended to show the latent nature of the 
danger. 
Mr. Robert Burton, employee of Burton Lumber for 
thirty years, said he thought the saw stayed put when 
pushed back. (R. at 825-826.) Larry Hester, a yardman 
for Burton Lumber and user of the saw, testified that h~ 
impression was that the saw did not move even a fraction 
of an inch when pushed back. (R. at 856.) Jessie Garcia, 
yardman for Burton Lumber, said he had never seen the 
saw move. (R. at 871.) Paul Moore said the only way he 
knew the saw would move was "to grab the handle and pull 
it out." (R. at 762.) 
On the strength of such evidence, and none showing 
the contrary, there was no way the jury could have found 
that the dangerous condition of the saw was open or 
obvious to a business invitee. In fact, an instruction 
including provisos relating to questions of obviousness 
may even have been confusing and misleading to the jurors. 
The Court did not err in instructing the jury as it did. 
B. When the jury instructions are read as a whole, 
they show that defendant's duty to a business invitee was 
properly explained and no error was corrunitted. 
It is a clearly established proposition of law that 
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in determining whether or not a trial court has fairly 
presented the issues of a case to the jury, the instructions 
will not be examined fragmentally nor in isolation. but will 
be considered as a whole. Black v. McKnight, 562 P.2d 
621, 622 (Utah 1977). The fact that a requested instruction, 
though it correctly states the law, is not given, does not 
constitute error, if the substance thereof was given in 
instructions of the court, (Hardman v. Thurman, 121 Utah 
143, 239 P.2d 215, 219 (1951)), or if the jury is other-
wise sufficiently advised of the issue it is to determine. 
In re Richards Estate, 5 Utah 2d 106, 297 P.2d 542, 545 
(1956). See also Ewell and Son Inc. v. Salt Lake City 
Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 P.2d 1283, 1288 (1972). 
As stated by this Court in Gilhespie v. DeJong, 
520 P.2d 878 (Utah 1974), the fact that a party is entitled 
to have the jury instructed in accordance with his theory ofthecase 
"does not mean that [the instruction] must be given in the 
exact language chosen by him. The requirement is met if 
the basic idea contended for is explained in ordinary, 
concise and understandable language." Id. at 880. 
The instructions of the trial court in the present 
case, when read as a whole, show that though the court 
did not employ the precise language urged upon it by 
defendant concerning duties owed to a business invitee 
it did instruct on such duties with sufficient clarity to avoid 
conunitting error. 
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Burton complains of the Court's giving of I 
· nstructior, 
No. 22, which reads as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22 
If you find by a preponderance of the evid . 
that, at the time of his injury, Mr. Moore was enc, 
defendant's "business invitee," as that term is 
defined hereinafte~, then defendant's duty to Mr. 
Moore was to refrain from any acts of negligence 
toward him; to exercise reasonable care to keep 
the premises, including the radial arm saw thereon 
i:r:1 a cc;indition reasonably safe for purposes consis~en\ 
with his presence there; and to warn him of any and 
all dangers involving the operation of said saw which 
were known to the defendant or should have become 
known to the defendant in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence and the performance of reasonable 
inspections. 
(R. at 327.) 
Instruction No. 2 2 was not the only one in which the 
court explained the nature of the defendant's duty to an 
invitee. In Instruction No. 21 (which was requested~ 
Burton Lumber, R. at 416) the duty of a lumber yard toward 
its business invitees was explained as follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21 
When a lumber yard is open for business, OM 
who enters it to purchase some commodity or service, 
is a business visitor or invitee. Upon the owner of 
the lumber yard, Burton Lumber and Hardware Company, 
the law places the duty of exercising ordinary care 
to not unnecessarily expose the business visitor or 
invitee to danger or accident and keep in reasonably 
safe condition the portions of the premises and . 
1 
equipment therein impliedly or expressly made ava1lab.: 
for the business visitor or invitee to use. 
* * * (R. at 326.) 
The court's Instruction No. 11 defined negligence as 
"the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person w~N 
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hJve done under the circumstances of the situation," 
(R. at 316.) Instruction No. 12 explained that a per-
son's duty to exercise caution varies. with the amount of 
danger reasonably to be apprehended: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
Inasmuch as the amount of caution used by the 
ordinary prudent person varies in direct proportion 
to the danger known to be involved in his undertaking, 
it follows that in the exercise of ordinary care, 
the amount of caution required will vary in accordance 
with the nature of the act and the surrounding cir-
cumstances. To put the matter in another way, the 
amount of caution required by the law increases as 
does the danger that reasonably should be apprehended 
increases. 
(R. at 317.) 
Upon examination of the whole of the instructions 
relative to Burton's duty toward an invitee, it cannot 
fairly be said that the jury was left to believe that 
said duty included an obligation to warn of dangers 
which were "readily available to the senses," or 
"perfectly obvious." Therefore, it was unnecessary for 
the court to have used the precise wording requested by 
defendant when giving its instructions. 
In Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 
491 P.2d 1209 (1971), an injured plaintiff complained of 
an adverse verdict on the basis of alleged errors in the jury 
instructions relating to contributory negligence. This 
Court's opinion of the alleged errors is instructive: 
If the language assigned as objectionable be 
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c::q 
excerpted and looked at in isolation there is 
some plausibility to plaintiff's argument that it 
might have the [adverse) effect he suggests. 
However, it will be noted that it was coupled wi~ 
the correct ~tatement that he was obliged to take 
such precautions as a reasonable and prudent per~n 
would take under the same circumstances. Notwith-
standing minor variants in the instructions if th 
11 . , ey are a considered together, as they are required 
to be, we think they adequately set forth the 
duties of the parties and properly submitted the 
issues to the jury. 
Id., 491 P.2d at 1210-1211. 
Here, as in Rowley, supra, there is no error that warr 
upsetting the jury verdict and judgment. 
C. Comparison of the Court's instructions concerning 
defendant's duties to licensees as opposed to business 
invitees does not demonstrate error with respect to the 
latter. 
Defendant points out that the court's instruction 
on duty to a licensee contains the type of language 
which it sought to have included in the proposed "invitee" 
instructions. Defendant then argues that if the court 
considered the language of the "licensee" instruction ~ 
be supported by evidence, it could not properly exclude 
such language from the "invitee" instruction. Such 
argument lacks merit for two reasons.; 
First, as has been shown above, the instructions, 
when read as a whole, make it clear that the jury was 
properly instructed concerning defendant's lack of 
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duty to warn of readily apparent and patently obvious 
dangers. 
Second, even if the jury had not been so instructed, 
the fact remains that there was no evidence to support 
the alleged existence of an obvious danger. (Supra at 13-14.) 
In that sense, the Court's "licensee" instruction, as 
worded, may also have been unwarranted by the facts of 
this case. In light of the outcome, however, any such 
error in this regard must surely be classed as harmless. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
D. Even if the court's instructions concerning 
defendant's duty toward an invitee had been erroneous, 
defendant has failed to show that they were prejudicial. 
Assuming, arguendo, that the trial court's refusal 
to give defendant's Requested Instruction No. 20 (R. at 
417) was error, Burton Lumber still has the burden of 
showing that such error was prejudicial to it in the 
sense that it resulted in substantial injustice, or 
that it deprived the defendant of its substantial rights. 
Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Utah 
Supreme Court has further explained this rule as 
follows: 
The mandate of our law is that we do not reverse 
for mere error or irregularity. We do so only if 
the complaining party has been deprived of a fair 
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trial. The test to be applied is: Was there 
e:r;ror. or irregula:r; i ty such that there is reasonable 
likelihood to believe that in its absence there 
would have been a result more favorable to him? 
If upon a survey of the whole evidence this 
question must be answered in the negative, then 
there is no justifiable basis for reversal of a judgment. 
Rowley v. Graven Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P. 2d 
1209, 1211 (1971). Cf. Ewell and Son, Inc. v. Salt Lake 
Corporation, 27 Utah 2d 188, 4 93 P. 2d 1283, 1288 (1972); 
Hall v. Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664, 666 (19U 
In the present case the jury found the defendant 
negligent in its conduct toward Paul Moore. NegligencG 
was defined for the jurors as being the failure to do 
what a reasonably prudent person would have done undff 
the circumstances of the situation. (R. at 316.) The 
evidence showed that the creeping tendency of the saw couL 
have been eliminated by such simple acts as placing blocks 
under the table legs, tilting the arm of the saw, or 
attaching a weight or spring to the cutting head. (R. ~ 
605, 638, 825-826.) The evidence also showed that none of 
these things had been done,despite the fact that their 
accomplishment was a minimum safety requirement. (R. at 
605, 618-619; 814-815; 957-958.) No evidence indicat~ 
that the creeping tendency of the saw was obvious. (~ 
at 13-14 . ) There is, therefore, no reasonable likelihood 
that the giving of the language proposed by defendant 
in its requested instruction No. 20 concerning its lack 
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of duty to warn of an obvious danger would, with any 
reasonable likelihood, have changed the outcome of the 
case. 
A portion of the language of defendant's requested 
instruction which the court refused to give spoke of the 
plaintiff's duty as follows: 
If there is danger attending the entry of the 
premises and the use of the equipment and if such 
danger arises from conditions readily apparent to 
the senses, the business visitor or invitee is 
under a duty to discover the danger. 
(R. at 417.) 
The only reponse favorable to defendant which the 
giving of the above instruction could have evoked from the 
jury, even if there had been evidence that the creeping 
tendency of the saw was obvious, would have been a finding 
that plaintiff, Paul Moore, was negligent. Since the jury 
in actuality found Paul Moore negligent, it cannot be said 
that the outcome of the case was prejudicially affected. In 
the absence of a showing of such prejudice the verdict of 
the jury and judgment of the court should not be disturbed. 
POINT II 
THE COURT'S REFUSAL TO GIVE DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS ON ASSUMPTION OF THE RISK WAS NOT 
ERRONEOUS NOR WAS IT PREJUDICIAL IN LIGHT OF THE 
FACTS AND CIRCUMSTAi.~CES OF THE CASE. 
The second error of law which defendant Burton Lumber 
claims was committed by the trial court sterns from the 
court's refusal to give defendant's requested instructions on 
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the doctrine of assumption of the risk. (R. at 408-410.) 
The same general legal principles discussed in Point I, 
supra, apply here. That is, the burden is on Burton Lumbe: 
to show that the court's action in this re ad g r was erroneou, 
and that said erroneous conduct, if any, was prejudicial 
to the outcome of the case and to defendant's substantial 
rights. (See supra at 9-10, for authorities cited.) 
As will be discussed below, the court did not err in 
refusing defendant's prof erred instructions because (1) 
the evidence does not support the application of the 
assumption of risk doctrine; (2) the Utah Comparative 
Negligence Statute authorizes the court's rejection of the 
assumption of risk doctrine under the circumstances of 
this case; and (3) even if defendant's primary/ 
secondary assumption of risk approach were to have been 
adopted, the evidence would not have warranted its 
application in this case. 
Furthermore, even if the failure to instruct on 
assumption of risk principles had been error, no prejudice 
resulted from such failure because of the state of the 
evidence presented and the lack of any reasonable likeli-
hood that the outcome of the case would have been changed. 
A. The court did not err in refusing to instruct ;E_e 
jury on the doctrine of assumption of risk, due to the ~ 
that there was insufficient evidence presented to have 
sustained such a defense theory. 
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Before the affirmative defense of assumption of risk 
can be applied, the defendant relying thereon must intro-
duce evidence that the plaintiff intelligently and 
deliberately, (sometimes referred to as freely and 
voluntarily), consented to assume a risk which was 
both known to him and appreciated by him. See Smith v. 
Clayton~mb~rt Manu!_actur:i_:_IJ_'I__Co., 488 F.2d 1345 (10th 
cir. 197 3); Erne!:';,t W:. Hahn, Inc. v. Armco Steel Co., 601 
P.2d 152 (Utah 1979); Hindmarsh v. O. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 
21 Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 (1968); Ferguson v. Jongsma, 
10 Utah 2d 179, 350 P.2d 404 (1960); Johnson v. Maynard, 
9 Utah 2d 268, 342 P.2d 884 (1959); Kuchenmeister v. Los 
Angeles & S.L.R. Co., 52 Utah 116, 172 P. 725, 729 (1918) 1 ; 
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§496D, 496G (1965). 
It is important to note that in Utah, for a plaintiff 
to be held to have assumed a risk, he must be shown to have 
been aware of it specifically. In Foster v. Steed, 23 Utah 
2d 148, 459 P.2d 1021 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
approvingly quoted Dean Prosser in saying that '"The fact that 
the plaintiff is fully aware of one risk * * * does not mean 
lThe language of the Kuchenmeister case is illustrative 
of the language generally used by the Court: " (B] efore he 
may be charged with having assumed the risk, [a plaintiff] 
must not only have fully understood and appreciated the 
danger, but he, in the very face of danger, must voluntarily 
have assumed the risk of injury." Kuchenmeister, 172 P.2d at 729. 
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that he assumes another of which he is unaware * * *. 111 
Id. at 1022-1023, n. 4, [citing W. Prosser, Handbook of U 
~
Law of Torts 464 (3d ed. 1964) .] Similarly, in Ferguso ---·~ 
v. Jongsma, supra, the court said, "Assumption of risk 
requires knowledge by plaintiff of a specific defect or 
dangerous condition . 
" Id. at 411. (Emphasis adde:. 
Such principles apparently grew out of the decision in 
Johnson v. Maynard, supra, wherein the court held that it 
was error to instruct on assumption of risk where the 
evidence did not show "that plaintiff was aware of the 
particular danger involved . II Id. at 887. (Emphas! 
added.) 
The particular danger out of which Paul Moore claims 
his injury arose was not that of being cut by the blade of 
an unguarded radial arm saw, as defendant would have this 
court believe. Rather, it was the danger of being cut by 
such a saw because of its unknown tendency to creep out 
spontaneously and unexpectedly from its return position. 
The saw's tendency to creep out from its return 
position has already been discussed. (Supra at 12-13.) 
Also discussed above was the absence of any evidence 
indicating that this creeping tendency was known to or 
observable by Paul Moore. Most of Burton Lumber's officers 
and employees said they were unaware of the creeping tendenc 
of the saw, despite their history of using it. (Supra atH· 
h h d 1 Used the Saw to Cut One board, and Mr. Moore, w o a on y 
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in so doing had held onto the handle of the saw the whole 
time, could not have been expected to know about or 
discover the drifting tendency. (See R. at 757-758.) Rather 
than show that Mr. Moore knew of the saw's dangerous 
propensities, such evidence tends to show affirmatively 
that he did not know and could not have known of them. 
In the absence of evidence that Mr. Moore knew of the 
saw's dangerous tendency to creep, it cannot be alleged that 
he appreciated that danger. Neither can it be said that 
he intelligently or deliberately consented to assume the 
resulting risks associated with the saw's operation. Thus, 
assumption of risk principles do not apply in this case. 
A question similar to the one discussed above was 
raised in a diversity case tried in the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah. McGrath v. Wallace 
Murray Corp., 496 F.2d 299 (10th Cir. 1974). There, the 
plaintiff was injured when an abrasive disc mounted on a 
grinding wheel which he was using, disintegrated. Plaintiff 
had not been using the guard which had been furnished with 
the wheel. From a jury verdict and judgment for the 
plaintiff, defendant appealed. One of the grounds for the 
appeal was the commission of alleged error by the trial 
court in failing to submit the case to the jury with 
instructions on assumption of risk. Though the case was 
reversed on other grounds, with respect to the assumption 
of risk question the Tenth circuit Court of Appeals ruled 
-25-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that "the trial court properly refused to give the 
instruction on assumption of the risk, since there 
was no 
evidence that McGrath [the inJ' ured plaintiff) h ad knowledge 
of a specific defect in the disc, which seems to be require: 
as the basis for the defense in Utah." Id. at 302. 
Plaintiff, Paul Moore, submits that in the instant 
case there was no evidence presented that he had knowledge 
of the specific dangers associated with use of the 
defendant's radial arm saw and that, therefore, the doctrir.' 
of assumption of risk was properly excluded by the trial 
court. 
B. The Utah Comparative Negligence Statute authorizes 
the court's refusal to specially instruct on the doctrine 
of assumption of risk under the circumstances of this case. 
One of the trial court's reasons for refusing to 
instruct the jury on the doctrine of assumption of the 
risk was its conclusion that the doctrine was comprehended 
within contributory negligence concepts in a comparative 
negligence case such as the present one. (R. at 899.) 
In reaching its conclusion, the court relied upon the 
following statute passed by the 1973 Utah State Legislature: 
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE - DIMINISHMENT OF DAMAGES-
"CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE" INCLUDES "ASSUMPTION OF THE 
RISK" --Contributory negligence shall not bar 
recovery in an action by any person or his.legal 
representative to recover damages for negl~ge~c~ 
or gross negligence resulting in death or in inJurY 
to person or property, if such negligence was not as 
g reat as the negligence or gross negligence of the ., 
. h b t any damaa,. person against whom recovery is soug t, u · 
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allowed shall be diminished in the proportion to 
the amount of negligence attributable to the person 
recovering. As used in this act, "Contributory 
negligence" includes "assumption of the risk.P 
§78-27-37, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. (Emphasis 
added.) 
Notwithstanding the express language of the foregoing 
statute that "contributory negligence shall not bar recovery" 
in a negligence action, and that '"contributory negligence' 
includes 'assumption of risk,'" defendant argues that 
assumption of risk is still a complete defense in Utah. 
See Brief of Appellant at 20. The thrust of defendant's 
argument is that there are two types of assumed risk, a 
primary type and a secondary type. It is argued that the 
legislature intended to include only the secondary type as 
a form of contributory negligence in comparative negligence 
cases. The reasoning then follows that if the primary 
type was not included, it must still be a complete bar 
to recovery. (See infra at 31-33 for a discussion of the 
distinction between primary and secondary type assumption 
of the risk.) 
When the legislature enacted the comparative negligence 
statute, it made no effort to define what it meant by 
assumed risk nor did it indicate that the term was used 
in any specialized or limited sense. Multiple earlier 
pronouncements of this court, however, had defined the 
term as consisting simply of the voluntary and intelligent 
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consent to assume a particular risk which was both knovm 
and appreciated. (See supra at 23.) Though it is true 
that in a footnote to one of its cases2 this court 
acknowledged that some commentators had recognized the 
primary/secondary assumption of risk dichotomy, the court 
appears never to have adopted the approach in Utah. 
Indeed, the fathers of the approach have themselves 
advocated its abandorunent.3 
In light of the foregoing it must be assumed that 
the legislature used "assumed risk" in its simple 
single-tier sense and that its intent in so doing was 
to eliminate the harsh effects of allowing affirmative 
defenses to serve as complete bars to a plaintiff's 
recovery for injuries produced in howsoever small a way 
2 
Calahan v. Wood, 24 Utah 2d B, 465 P.2d 169, 172, 
n. 8 (1970). 
3n [Q] uite aside from any questions of policy or of 
substance, the concept of assuming the risk is purely 
duplicative of other more widely understood concepts, 
such as scope of duty or contributory negligence. The 
one exception is to be found, perhaps, in those cases 
where there is an actual agreement. 
* * * 
"Except for express assumption of risk therefore, 
the term and the concept should be abolished. It adds 
nothing to modern law except confusion, "2 F. Harper 
& F. James, The Law of Torts §21.8 (1956). 
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by his own fault. Dean Prosser would agree: 
It can scarcely be supposed in reason that the 
legislature has intended to allow a partial 
recovery to the plaintiff who has been so 
negligent as not to discover his peril at all, 
and deny it to one who has at least exercised 
proper care in that respect, but has made a 
mistake of judgment in proceeding to encounter 
the danger after it is known. 
w. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 457 (4th ed. 1971) 
Defendant has attempted in its brief to bolster its 
primary assumption of the risk argument by citing a 1976 
Oregon Appeals Court case which construed Oregon's compara-
tive negligence statute in a way favorable to defendant's 
position. (See citation of Becker v. Beaverton School 
District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498 (Or.App. 1976), Brief of 
Appellant at 28-30.) Defendant argues that because of 
similarities between Oregon's and Utah's comparative 
negligence laws, this court should rule after the fashion 
of the Oregon Appeals Courts. 
In 1973 the Oregon and Utah comparative negligence 
statutes contained the following language: 
OREGON 
Contributory negligence, 
including assumption of the risk 
~11 not bar recovery in an 
action *~1TSuchnegITgence 
contributing to the injury was 
not as great as the negligence 
of the person against whom 
recovery is sought * * * . 
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UTAH 
Contributory negli-
shall not bar recovery in 
an action * * * if such 
negligence contributing to 
the injury was not as great 
as the negligence of the 
person against whom recove:y 
is sought * * *· As used in 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Or. Rev. Stat. §18.470 
(1973). (Emphasis added.) this act, "contribut 1 . ory neg_~gence 11 incluaes--'-
"assumption of therisk, 
§78 27 37 Utah Cod~· 
1953, as a~h 
added.) P~ 
The Becker court reasoned that the term 11 
assumption of 
the risk," as used in the Oregon statute was, because of 
its grammatical location in the sentence, intended to 
refer to secondary assumption of risk only, and that, 
therefore, primary assumption of risk remained a complete 
bar to recovery by plaintiff. Becker, supra at 502. 
Several factors make interpretation of Utah's statute 
much different then Oregon's. First, the Becker court was 
constrained to apply the primary/secondary approach to 
the assumption of risk doctrine because said approach had 
been adopted as the law of Oregon in 196 2 by the Oregon 
Supreme Court. See Renner v. Kinney, 231 Or. 552, 373 P.2d 
668 (1962). Utah has never adopted this confusing approacn 
and should not do so now. 
Second, Utah's Legislature placed the term "assumption 
of the risk" in a different portion of the statute than 
did Oregon's. Thus, in Utah's statute, the term was not 
limited in its scope by a confining equivalent antecedent. 
Third, Oregon has now, interestingly enough, abolished 
the doctrine of primary assumption of the risk except in it: 
express sense, thus indicating general dissatisfaction with 
the approach taken in Becker, supra. See 1975 Or. Laws, 
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ch. 599 §4; Or.Rev.Stat. §18.470 (1974). 
The Utah Comparative Negligence Act has declared the 
assumption of risk doctrine to be included as a form of 
contributory negligence. Therefore, in a comparative 
negligence case, a trial court is not obligated to 
instruct on more than one of the doctrines. Though it 
may not be error for a court to give separate instructions 
on both doctrines in a proper case, (see Rigtrup v. Straw-
berry Water Users Association, 563 P.2d 1247 (Utah 1977)), neither 
is it error for a court to refuse to give assumption of risk 
instructions in a case where proper contributory negligence 
instructions have already been given. Since such instructions 
were given in this case, there is no reason to disturb the jury 
verdict. 
c. The evidence in this case does not support the 
application of primary assumption of risk principles even 
if the primary/secondary assumption of risk approach were 
to be adopted as the law in Utah. 
Under the primary/secondary approach to the 
assumption of risk doctrine, secondary type assumption 
of risk is a mere form of and is legally considered 
identical to the doctrine of contributory negligence. 2 
F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts §21.1 at 1162 (1956); 
57 Am.Jur.2d Negligence §279 (1971). The elements of 
secondary assumption of risk are acknowledged to be comprehended 
-31-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
within a proper set of instructions l' on neg igence and 
contiibutory negligence. Since such instructions were . 
given 
in this case, defendant cannot, and presumably d 
oes not cJo:. 
that error was committed in this respect. 
The doctrine of primary assumption of risk, which 
defendant claims should have been applied in this case, 
is not a form of contributory negligence. It does not 
involve questions of a plaintiff's conduct, but, rather, 
is generally considered to be but an alternate way of 
expressing the idea that the defendant owes no duty to the 
plaintiff. See Harper & James, supra; 57 Am.Jur.2d, supra 
at §276; 6 UCLA-Alaska L.Rev. 244, 249-50 (1977). 
There are two types of primary assumption of risk. 
One which arises from a plaintiff's express consent to 
relieve a defendant of a duty of care, and another which 
arises from an implied consent to do the same. Express 
consent is given by agreement such as when two prize 
fighters agree to a bout, or when two businessmen agree 
to the sale of a piece of equipment with a known or 
acknowledged defect for which the seller wishes to assume 
no responsibility. 
Implied consent. on the other hand, does not involve 
an agreement between parties, but arises from circumstances 
indicating a willingness on the part of one party to relieve 
h · Because the another of certain responsibilities toward im. 
effect of claiming "no duty" can be harsh, in order to imply 
such consent as is required to trigger application of this 
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doctrine, one must establish special circumstances. The 
courts and commentator's have rather uniformly required a 
danger to be "open and obvious;" 4 "fully comprehended or 
perfectly obvious;" 5 "obvious, . . customary and 
ly know .. ,. 116 or ... common n "palpable, 117 before 
they have been willing to imply a person's consent to 
relieve another of a duty of care toward him. An example 
of such an assumption would be where an adult puts his 
fingers into an electrical outlet, or enters a line of 
fire on a target range during the shooting. 
Burton Lumber does not contend that Paul Moore 
expressly consented to assume the risk of injury to his 
hand. Its allegations are that the danger of an unguarded 
saw is so obvious that a consent which would eliminate 
duty should be implied. In making such an argument, defendant 
ignores the fact that the danger associated with this saw 
was not its mere lack of guards, but, rather, the tendency 
for its blade to creep spontaneously away from the return 
position and toward an unsuspecting operator. As has been 
pointed out, supra at 14 , such a condition was anything 
4Becker v. Beaverton School District No. 48, 551 P.2d 498, 
500 (Or.App. 1976.) 
5Renner v. Kinn~, 231 or. 552, 373 P.2d 668, 671 (1962). 
6Harper & James, The Law of Torts, §21.2 at 1170 (1956) · 
753 Or. 1973) L. Rev. 79, 81 ( . 
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but obvious. 
No evidence of obviousness was introduced at trial. 
The evidence that was introduced with respect to the saw's 
tendency to creep showed this dangerous tendency to be 
latent. There simply was no basis upon which a question 
concerning obviousness could be argued to have arisen in 
the present case. The court, therefore, acted properly 
in instructing the jury as it did. 
Defendant's citation of this Court's holding in 
Rigtrup v. Strawberry Water Users Association, 563 P.~ 
1247 (Utah 1977), as authority for its position1 is inappositi 
The facts in Rigtrup are wholly different from those of the 
present case. There, the plaintiff had been specific~~ 
informed of the inadequacy of his electrical system, had 
been warned of the likelihood of power interruptions and 
the need for backup generators, had experienced power 
outages as a result of such interruptions, had been ~M 
that his system was improperly wired, and had even had his 
system fail due to such faulty wiring. The risks connected 
I 
with a power outage could be said to have been so obvious tol 
him under the facts of the case, as to absolve the power 
company of any duty to prevent outages to him. 
In the present case, however, there was no evidence 
that Paul Moore knew of the radial arm saw's tendency to 
creep. Neither was there any evidence to show that Mr. 
Moore had been informed of the saw's tendency to creep or 
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had witnessed or experienced the phenomenon before. 
Minimum standards for radial arm saws required that they 
be so mounted or equipped as to prevent any independent 
or spontaneous forward motion of the cutting head. 
Undisputed evidence showed violations of those minimum 
standards. Clearly it cannot be said under the circumstances 
of this case that defendant was entitled to have the court 
instruct the jury on assumption of the risk in its 
primary sense. 
D. Even if the Court's refusal to separately instruct 
the jury on the assumption of risk doctrine had been 
erroneous, defendant has failed to show that said refusal 
was prejudicial. 
As has been fully discussed above, in advocating 
reversal of a jury verdict because of alleged errors in 
the instructions, an appellant must show not only error, 
but also prejudice. (Supra at 19-20.) The measure of 
prejudice is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that 
in the absence of the "error" the result would have been 
more favorable to the complaining party. Rowley v. Graven 
Brothers & Co., 26 Utah 2d 448, 491 P.2d 1209, 1211 (1971). 
Assuming that the court had instructed the jury on 
assumption of risk, the result of this case would only have 
been altered if the jury had found that the dangerous 
creeping tendency of the saw was known or should have 
been known to Paul Moore. The absence of any evidence to 
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support such a conclusion has already been pointed 
out. 
{Supra at 13-14.) It cannot be said that there is any 
reasonable likelihood that the outcome of this case Ws 
prejudicially affected by the actions and decisions Of the 
Court. The jury's verdict should stand. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO EVIDENTIARY BASIS TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S 
CONTENTIONS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUCT WAS THE SOLE 
PROXIMATE CAUSE OR EVEN A PROXIMATE CAUSE OF 
HIS INJURIES AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Burton Lumber claims that Paul Moore was negligent 
in (1) using its radial arm saw without first adjusting 
the hood guard, and {2) placing his hands in the line 
of cut of the blade. 8 Brief of Appellant at 34-37. WheH. 
the jurors relied on these factors in reaching their ~~~ 
will never be known. Suffice it to say that they found 
Mr. Moore negligent. However, the jury also found that 
Mr. Moore's negligence was not a proximate cause of his 
injuries. Defendant says the jury's latter finding was 
incorrect. It argues that plaintiff's negligence should 
Bit is important to note that the blade guards which 
Mr. Barbe referred to as being minimum safety requirements 
were in addition to what defendant refers to as the ho~ 
guard. Concerning said hood guard, Mr. Barbe testified 
that it was not an adequate machine guard and may or may 
not have been able to keep a hand away from the saw blade. 
(R. at 632.) 
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have been ruled to be a proximate cause of his injuries as a 
matter of law. In fact, says defendant, Mr. Moore's 
negligence should have been ruled to be the sole proximate 
cause of his injuries as a matter of law. Such a position 
finds no support in law or logic. 
In Utah, in order for someone's negligence to be 
deemed a proximate cause of injury it must meet certain 
criteria: (1) it must be the primary moving cause without 
which the injury would not have been inflicted, (2) it must 
operate in a natural and probable sequence of events to pro-
duce injury without intervention of what would be classed 
as a supervening cause, and (3) it must be a substantial 
or material factor in bringing about such injury. See Cox 
v. Thompson, 123 Utah 81, 254 P.2d 1047 (1953); Hall v. 
Blackham, 18 Utah 2d 164, 417 P.2d 664 (1966). 
It is apparent from their verdict that the jurors 
believed the evidence that Paul Moore's hand never slipped 
or moved into the saw blade when his fingers were amputated 
(R. at 761.) It is also apparent from their verdict that 
the jurors believed the evidence that the saw spontaneously 
and unexpectedly drifted forward from its return position 
and sliced into Mr. Moore's hand while he was sighting down 
the board he was preparing to cut. It is true that if 
Plaintiff's hand had not been in the line of cut of the blade, 
the drifting saw would not have contacted it. Such a fact, 
however, does not compel the jury to find, as a matter of 
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law, that plaintiff's hand position was a proximate 
cause 
of his injuries, any more than the fact that a person's 
ignorant use of a car with faulty brakes compels a 
finding that he is therefore a proximate cause of any 
collision he might be in, no matter what the drivers of 
other vehicles do. 
In order for the jury to have been directed to find 
plaintiff's hand position to be a proximate cause of his 
injury as defendant urges, it would have to appear from 
the evidence that reasonable minds could not differ in 
concluding that by such conduct Mr. Moore played a sub-
stantial role in causing the saw to move forward and ~~ 
his hand; and further that said saw's movement was the 
natural and probable consequence of his hand being placed 
where it was. If the evidence admitted any other 
reasonable conclusion, the questions were for the jury. Giver 
the state of the record, the court's submission of the issue: 
to the jury was proper. 
Defendant's contentions that plaintiff's negligence 
(in whatsoever form the jury found it to exist) was the sole 
proximate cause of his injuries, as a matter of law, cannot 
pass muster. When a jury of concededly reasonable men and 
women conclude, on the basis of proper instructions, that 
plaintiff's negligence was not even ~ proximate cause of 
his injuries; and where the jurors are not alleged to ~w 
. . d . and no evidence acted on the basis of passion or preJu ice, 
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of passion or prejudice is put forth, it stretches the 
imagination to suppose that a court should declare the 
opposite to be the case and then bootstrap such a declaration 
into a directed verdict that the negligence was the sole 
proximate cause thereof. Defendant's argument in support 
of its position is very short. It merits only a very 
short response. 
The case of Velasq1.i"ez v. Greyhound Lines, ·rnc. , 
12 Utah 2d 379, 366 P. 2d 989 (1961) (relied upon by 
defendant) says that before the negligent perception of a 
danger can be the sole proximate cause of an injury, the 
danger must be so obvious that it cannot fail to be observed 
and avoided. Id. 366 P.2d at 991. In the present case the 
dangerous creeping tendency was latent. No evidence of its 
obviousness was presented to even raise a jury question 
thereon, let alone require a determination in defendant's 
favor as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
An examination of the whole record in this case shows 
that defendant's appeal for reversal of the trial court's 
decision should be denied. The trial was conducted 
fairly and properly. The jurors received appropriate 
instructions on the law applicable to the case and their 
verdict was supported by the evidence. In any lawsuit of 
several days duration, counsel can usually find something 
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to complain about. Ew:=l-.~-~!2_~--~on, -~12C:~ ___ ':'._:_~~Ske City 
--~ ~~~~~t:ioi:_, 27 Utah 2d 188, 493 ~. 2d 1283 1 1288 (19?2). 
Nevertheless, absent a showing of real error 1 
resu ting in 
substantial prejudice, in the sense of there being a 
reasonable likelihood of unfairness or injustice, the 
decision of the trial court will be sustained. Id. 
As has been pointed out above, the Court's instructio:, 
on defendant's duty to a business invitee were neither 
erroneous nor prejudicial for several reasons: (1) There 
was no evidence that the dangerous tendency of the saw to 
creep forward spontaneously from its return position while 
running was or should have been obvious to a user such as 
Paul Moore; therefore, the court did not err in omitting 
defendant's proffered language concerning such dangers fro: 
its instructions. ( 2) A reading of the whole of the jury 
instructions shows that jurors were properly instructed 
concerning the duty of defendant to warn business inviteeSi 
dangers connected with use of the saw; therefore, there was 
no error. (3) There was no showing that defendant's right: 
were substantially affected or that the outcome of the 
case would, with any reasonable likelihood, have been 
different; therefore there was no prejudice. 
The Court's refusal to separately instruct the jury 
on assumption of the risk was also not prejudicially 
erroneous for several reasons; (1) No evidence was 
umptior introduced to prove the essential elements of the ass 
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of risk theory; therefore, the jury should not have been 
instructed thereon. (2) The Utah Comparative Negligence 
Statute authorized the actions of the trial judge in declining 
to give defendant's proffered assumption of risk instructions. 
(3) Even if the Court were to have adopted defendant's 
theory concerning the two-tier approach to assumption of 
risk, there was no evidence to support its application 
in this case. (4) There was no showing that the refusal 
to separately instruct on assumption of risk affected 
defendant's substantial rights or changed the probable out-
come of the case. 
Defendant's last complaint of error, that the evidence 
was so plain against the plaintiff that the court should 
have directed a verdict against him on the proximate cause 
issue, is groundless. The evidence showed not just that 
plaintiff's hand was cut in a radial arm saw but also that 
said saw had a latent and very dangerous tendency to 
spontaneously creep forward from its return position while 
running. This dangerous condition existed as a result of 
admitted violations of what both parties recognized to be 
minimum safety standards. The evidence further showed that 
plaintiff had no way of knowing that this dangerous tendency 
existed, and that while he was operating the saw, the 
whirling blade unexpectedly drifted forward and grabbed 
his hand, amputating three of his fingers and severely 
cutting two others. In the face of such evidence and more, 
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defendant's argument that reasonable men and women could r,', 
reach the decision that they did is untenable. 
In light of the foregoing, Plaintiff/Respondent h~ 
Moore respectfully submits that the verdict and judgment 
of the court below should be affirmed. 
RESPEC·rFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of January 1 198~, 
HANSEN & THOMPSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Respo: 
2020 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: 533-0400 
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